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PART II  Bordering Afghanistan: Threats and Opportunities
Turkmenistan’s Afghan Border Conundrum 
Jan Šír and Slavomír Horák
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 the former Soviet 
republics found themselves in an entirely novel geopolitical setting. One of 
the necessary steps in affirming their existence as new, independent states 
was for these post-Soviet republics to face the need of establishing their 
international borders. This process included both the creation of new 
international borders between the republics themselves as well as the 
transformation of their existing Soviet borders with third countries. In 
Central Asia, this challenge pertained clearly to Turkmenistan, the 
southernmost republic of the former Soviet Union that inherited the longest 
section of the southern Soviet borders with Afghanistan and Iran. In this 
chapter we focus on Afghanistan as a reference point in regard to this 
transformation of the former external Soviet border. We examine 
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan after 1991 and argue that 
the shaping of relations between the two neighboring countries is a specific 
case of building transborder ties, the evolution of which derives from the 
distinct path of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy. Our analysis reveals the inner 
tensions inherent to the making of foreign policy in Turkmenistan, 
specifically the tensions that arise between the quest for alternative export 
markets for its most valued, and largely only, assets in energy and the 
imperative to preserve the newly established regime despite its perception as 
being largely incompatible with the open and geopolitically exposed 
international environment in which it is to function.
The chapter begins with an overview of the delineation and constitution 
of the border between Afghanistan and what traditionally used to be the 
Turkmen-inhabited tribal areas of Central Asia. The time span of our 
examination of the historical background extends from the late nineteenth 
century and the Soviet decades to Turkmenistan’s independence. Following 
this, the chapter continues with four sections that each deal with one area of 
interaction between the two neighboring states. The first provides an 
overview of political relations after 1991 and outlines Turkmenistan’s 
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foreign policy towards Afghanistan with a rough periodization up to the 
present. Next, we focus on trade and economic affairs where major 
infrastructure projects play an ever-growing role. There follows a discussion 
of the still rather infrequent people-to-people contacts between Turkmenistan 
and Afghanistan as seen from the point of view of the regime in Ashgabat. 
Finally, Turkmenistan’s changing border security will be assessed through an 
analysis of the latest radical Islamist insurgency arising from Afghanistan 
and the subsequent border clashes that have taken place. We note here that 
regional affairs will not be in the center of our discussion. Nevertheless, we 
occasionally digress into the geopolitics of Central Asia so as to highlight the 
way in which, as we argue, Afghanistan matters most to Turkmenistan, that 
is, as a possible bridge linking it to its prospective export markets farther to 
the south. 
Historical Background
Historically, the Turkmen-Afghan border, and the very notion thereof as a 
border, occurred no earlier than the late nineteenth century, and it came about 
as a result of the delineation of spheres of influence within Central Asia 
between the Russian and British Empires. Until that time, Turkmen pastoral 
areas were under the reign of local tribal authorities, which were subject to 
constant interference from the rulers of Bukhara, Khiva and Persia. The 
advance of Tsarist Russia into the region was dictated by both commercial 
and military strategic interests. The eventual conquest of the Turkmen lands 
by the Russian army opened up the prospect of consolidating Russia’s grip 
over the vast territories ranging from China to the Caspian Sea. In this sense, 
the Turkmen-Afghan borderlands became the setting for the final stage of the 
“Great Game” rivalries between Russia and Britain.1
                                                          
1 Evgenii Sergeev, Bol’shaia igra, 1856–1907. Mify i realii rossiisko-britanskikh otnoshenii 
v Tsentral’noi i Vostochnoi Azii (Moscow: KMK, 2012), 184. For Russia’s conquest of 
Turkmenistan, see A. Karryev and A. Rosliakov, Kratkii ocherk istorii Turkmenistana (ot 
prisoedineniia k Rossii do Velikoi Oktiabr’skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii, 1868–1917
gg.) (Ashgabat: Turkmengosizdat, 1956); and M. Tikhomirov, Prisoedinenie Merva k 
Rossii (Moskow: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoi istorii, 1960). For recent interpretations of 
Russia’s advance into Central Asia, see Alexander Morrison,“‘Nechto eroticheskoe,’ 
‘courir après l’ombre’?—logistical imperatives and the fall of Tashkent, 1859–1865,” 
Central Asian Survey 33, no. 2 (2014): 153–69. For a readable account of the Great Game, 
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The Turkmen-Afghan borderlands once again became unstable following 
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, when the Russian civil war hit Central 
Asia. A local resistance movement, the basmachi, emerged and found 
footholds in the north of Afghanistan in order to rise up against the new 
Soviet regime from there.2 Large groups of Turkmens subsequently left for 
Afghanistan in several waves. The proclamation of the Bukhara People’s 
Soviet Republic in 1920, in effect, pushed out some 40,000–50,000 
Turkmens, particularly from the regions of Charjew (today’s Turkmenabat) 
and Kerki (or Atamurat).3 Another 100,000 moved south from the Turkmen 
Soviet Socialist Republic following the water and agrarian reforms and the 
anti-religious campaigns of the 1920s and 1930s.4 Stalin’s collectivization of 
agriculture caused some additional 50,000 Turkmens to flee to Afghanistan 
and Iran.5 Migration continued for some years despite the closing of the 
border in 1932 and the often dire conditions of life on the Afghan side of the 
border. As a result, substantial parts of the north and north-west of 
Afghanistan were settled by ethnic Turkmens, and the local economy was
enriched by, for instance, the famous qaraqul sheep industry.6
For most of the Soviet period the border between Soviet Turkmenia and 
Afghanistan remained closed, both in the administrative and in the physical 
senses. Border fortifications and barriers were erected alongside the 
delineation line by the Soviets, thereby making transborder flows 
                                                                                                                            
see the classic by Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia
(London: John Murray, 1991).
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"@@ * }}   	 + Acta Universitatis 
Carolinae – Studia Territorialia 14, no. 1–2 (2014): 11–47. For the Basmachi uprising, see 
Martha Brill Olcott, “The Basmachi or Freemen’s Revolt in Turkestan 1918–24,” Soviet 
Studies 33, no. 3 (1981): 352–69; and A. I. Plyev, Basmachestvo v Srednei Azii: 
etnopoliticheskii srez (vzgliad iz XXI veka) (Bishkek: Kyrgyzsko-Rossiiskii Slavianskii 
Universitet, 2006). 
3 Charles Shaw, “Friendship under lock and key: the Soviet Central Asian border, 1918–34,” 
Central Asian Survey 30, no. 3–4 (2011): 338. 
4 Audrey C. Shalinsky, “Islam and Ethnicity: The Northern Afghanistan Perspective,” 
Central Asian Survey 1, no. 2–3 (1982): 74–75.
5 Shokhrat Kadyrov, Tainy turkmenskoi demografii (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniia RAN, 
2010), 94–95; and Adrienne Lynn Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet 
Turkmenistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 213–20. For the migration 
processes in the context of political developments in Turkmenistan under the Soviets, see 
also Rakhim Esenov, Dukhovnaia oppozitsiia v Turkmenistane 1917–1935 (Moscow: s.n., 
2002). 
6 Viktor Korgun, Istoriia Afganistana: XX vek (Moscow: Kraft+, Institut vostokovedeniia 
RAN, 2004), 102.
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increasingly more difficult. Due to the fact that the attitudes of the Afghan 
Turkmens, and in particular of their tribal elites, were far from sympathetic to 
the Soviet regime, there was little reason for them to maintain close ties with 
their brethren on the opposite side of the border. Afghan Turkmens were also 
recruited in large numbers to work for German or Japanese intelligence 
services before World War II as they hoped for the defeat of the Soviet 
Union and for a return to their homelands.7
Despite the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan’s industrialization 
between the 1950s and 1970s, transborder contacts intensified again only 
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan after 1979. The border crossing in 
Gushgy (today’s Serhetabat, meaning “border town” in Turkmen) became 
one of the two key entry points for invading Soviet troops and the supplies 
entering Afghanistan. Moreover, the Turkmens, just as Uzbeks and Tajiks, 
were contracted in high numbers by the Soviet army, since they could serve 
as interpreters and possessed knowledge of local social conditions. Due to 
the increasing number of Turkmens switching sides and joining the Afghan 
anti-Soviet resistance, however, this practice was soon abandoned.8
The relationship of the Afghan Turkmen diaspora to their northern 
brethren, and to the Soviets in general, was characterized by caution. The 
historical memory transmitted by the descendants of refugees who had fled 
the Bolshevik regime in the 1920s and 1930s was largely negative in nature.9
The Soviets were for the most part concerned about the Central Asian 
diasporas in Afghanistan, especially that of the Turkmens, because the mood 
for resistance amongst them was considered to be higher than amongst other 
minorities.10 Curiously, this resistance among the Turkmens has not been 
transformed into a strong national movement on either side of the border. 
                                                          
7 Iurii Tikhonov, Afganskaia voina Stalina. Bitva za Tsentral’nuiu Aziiu (Moscow: IaUZA, 
EKSMO, 2008), 410–25. 
8 M. Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 183.
9 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002), 30. 
10 Eden Naby, “Uzbeks in Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 3, no. 1 (1984): 1–21. 
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Overview of Political Relations After 1991
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a watershed for the Turkmens and 
their relations with their neighbors. This was not least because, prior to 1991, 
a state entity corresponding to the territory of today’s Turkmenistan had 
never before existed. Accordingly, the status of the 800-km-long border with 
Afghanistan has also undergone change. Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has 
been primarily an extension of the state and nation-building processes that 
have largely remained unfinished to this day. From the very beginning, the 
main function of its foreign policy has been the legitimization of the new 
regime and the securing of its survival.11 In conceptual terms, since 1992 
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has been based on the principles of “positive 
neutrality” which, in practice, quickly degraded to isolationism in 
international affairs under Turkmenbashi, the “Head of the Turkmens,” as 
Turkmenistan’s first president Saparmurat Niyazov was called; energy 
exports, however, remained a notable exception. This explains 
Turkmenistan’s specific approach to, and its very selective engagement in, 
international affairs, which can be exemplified through its relations with 
neighboring Afghanistan. 
Despite some first tentative steps in the time of late perestroika, the 
process of establishing direct political ties with Afghanistan began only in 
the post-independence period. Diplomatic relations between both countries 
were established on February 21, 1992, on the occasion of the visit of Vice-
President of the Republic of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Hatef to Ashgabat. 
Voicing a readiness by the Najibullah government to open trading points in 
the ports on the Amu Darya River, the agenda proposed by Kabul focused 
mostly on procuring specialists from Turkmenistan to achieve the 
                                                          
11 For perhaps the most comprehensive account of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy, see the 
book by Luca Anceschi, Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the 
consolidation of the Turkmen Regime (New York: Routledge, 2008), who also convincingly 
made this case. For the best comprehensive works on post-Soviet Turkmenistan, see 
Sebastien Peyrouse, Turkmenistan: Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2012); and, from Russian language publications, also Sergei M. 
Demidov, Postsovetskii Turkmenistan (Moscow: Natalis, 2002); and Shokhrat Kadyrov, 
“Natsiia” plemen. Etnicheskie istoki, transformatsiia, perspektivy gosudarstvennosti v 
Turkmenistane (Moscow: Tsentr tsivilizatsionnykh i regional’nykh issledovanii RAN, 
2003). 
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electrification of Afghanistan’s north and north-west.12 In order to facilitate 
these contacts, Turkmenistan opened consular missions in Mazar-e Sharif 
and Herat in 1993. The consulates did not cease their operations even during 
the fiercest period of fighting in the late 1990s and they remained 
Turkmenistan’s main liaison offices in Afghanistan for nearly a decade.13
However, the continuing fragmentation of the country was a problem in that 
control over Afghanistan’s provinces in the north and north-west by the 
central government in Kabul, and hence its ability to ensure compliance with 
its policies, was contingent on its loose authority over local warlords who, in 
effect, administrated these territories. For this reason, in order to achieve 
progress Ashgabat was forced to clear any outstanding issues first with 
General Abdul Rashid Dostum and Mohammed Ismail Khan, the rulers of, 
respectively, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat. 
In March 1996, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan 
Burhanuddin Rabbani visited Ashgabat for a meeting with Turkmenbashi to 
discuss mostly transborder trade.14 However, this first bilateral summit was 
to remain the last meaningful contact between Ashgabat and Kabul for a long 
time, as the north-west of the country around Herat by then had fallen under 
firm control of the Pashto-dominated Taliban movement, who proceeded to 
conquer Kabul later that year.15 Moreover, by 1995 Turkmenistan had 
achieved the recognition of its declared neutrality by the United Nations16––a
success it deliberately used as an ideological rationale for keeping its 
distance from any foreign policy activities that it deemed to compromise its 
high international status. Thus, for the following years most transborder 
                                                          
12 Turkmen Press, “Priem u Prezidenta Turkmenistana,” Turkmenskaia iskra, February 22, 
1992.
13 Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana Ob otkrytii Konsul’stva Turkmenistana v 
Islamskom Gosudarstve Afganistan (g. Mazari-Sharif), Sobranie aktov Prezidenta 
Turkmenistana i reshenii Pravitel’stva Turkmenistana, no. 8, art. 1476 (1993): 46–48; and 
Postanovlenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana Ob otkrytii Konsul’stva Turkmenistana v 
Islamskom Gosudarstve Afganistan (g. Gerat), Sobranie aktov Prezidenta Turkmenistana i 
reshenii Pravitel’stva Turkmenistana, no. 11, art. 1647 (1993): 24–25. 
14 Press-kommiunike po itogam vizita v Turkmenistan pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii Islamskogo 
Gosudarstva Afganistan vo glave s Prezidentom B. Rabbani, Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan,
March 8, 1996. 
15 For the Taliban taking over Afghanistan between 1994 and 1999, see Ahmed Rashid, 
Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 
31–81. 
16 United Nations. General Assembly. A-B: 90th plenary meeting December 12, 1995. 
Maintenance of international security. A. Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan. A/RES/
50/80. 
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contacts consisted of illicit trade, in particular drug trafficking and possibly 
also arms smuggling, which increased in volume after the Russian border 
guards left Turkmenistan’s “outer” borders at the end of 1999.17 In 1999 and 
2000, three rounds of unsuccessful peace talks were held, with great 
propaganda fanfare, between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance in 
Ashgabat under the auspices of the UN.18 After these talks ultimately failed 
in late 2000, the UN Security Council imposed a nearly total embargo against 
the Taliban-ruled Islamic Emirate, thereby leaving Turkmenistan with little
space for cultivating relations with its neighbor.19
The September 11 attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom provided the 
isolationist Turkmenbashi regime with both opportunities and challenges. 
Having only hesitantly joined the U.S.-led coalition in its War on Terror, in 
early 2002 Turkmenistan declined an official request from Berlin to establish 
a military base on its territory in order to support the German Bundeswehr in 
its operations in north Afghanistan.20 Nonetheless it made available air and 
land corridors for the delivery of international humanitarian aid to 
Afghanistan and received a further incentive to enhance its diplomatic profile 
                                                          
17 “Turkmenistan: vlasti stroiat ‘zheleznyi zanaves’ po retseptam stalinskoi diktatury,” 
Pravozashchitnyi tsentr Memorial, July 31, 2001, http://www.memo.ru/d/183.html. See also
Rustem Safronov, “Turkmenistan’s Niyazov Implicated in Drug Smuggling,” Eurasia 
Insight, March 28, 2002, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/
eav032902.shtml. For an overview of the drug trade in the post-Soviet region and the 
Afghanistan connection, see Uwe Halbach, “Drogenströme durch den GUS-Raum. 
Symptom und Ursache von Unstabilität,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 
2004, 22–24, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2004_ S47_
hlb_ks.pdf.
18 Turkmen Press, “V poiskakh mira i soglasiia v Afganistane. Priem u Prezidenta 
Turkmenistana,” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, February 12, 1999; Turkmen Press, “Uspekh 
ashkhabadskikh peregovorov. Afganskie storony vpervye dogovorilis’ po kliuchevym 
voprosam,” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, March 15, 1999; and Türkmendöwlethabarlary––
TDH, “V stolitse neitral’nogo Turkmenistana posle dolgogo pereryva sostoialsia 
ocherednoi mezhafganskii dialog,” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, December 12, 2000. 
19 United Nations. Resolution 1333 (2000). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4251st 
meeting, on December 19, 2000. S/RES/1333 (2000). For Turkmenistan’s highly critical 
stance towards the international sanction regime against the Taliban, see, for instance, 
Turkmenbashi’s speech to the diplomatic corps accredited in Ashgabat from early 2001, 
published as “My zhelaem mira i blagopoluchiia dlia vsekh. Vystuplenie Prezidenta 
Turkmenistana na vstreche s inostrannymi diplomatami (15 fevralia 2001 goda),” 
Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, March 5, 2001.
20 TDH, “Prezident Turkmenistana prinial Chrezvychainogo i Polnomochnogo Posla
Germanii,” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, January 8, 2002. 
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there by opening an embassy in Kabul.21 Importantly, the increased 
international attention directed at Turkmenistan as an emerging transit hub 
gave Ashgabat an additional boost in its ambitious development plans, 
particularly in regard to the expansion of its transport infrastructure. Such 
infrastructure would become important to Turkmenistan once the foreign 
policy priorities of the Ashgabat government evolved at a later point in 
time.22
This finally happened under Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, who came 
to power in late 2006 following Turkmenbashi’s unexpected death in office. 
From the very beginning the new Turkmen leader set an energetic foreign 
policy agenda. Gradually, and still in a selective and careful manner, 
isolationism began to be replaced by a diversification of external relations, 
particularly in the context of the gas industry where Turkmenistan achieved 
significant progress by opening new export routes to China and Iran. 
Obviously, regional cooperation plays a prominent role in these endeavors.23
From the summer of 2007 onwards, when the first official top-level meeting 
of Presidents Berdimuhamedow and Karzai took place, relations between 
Turkmenistan and Afghanistan produced a series of summits as well as a 
noticeable activation in all spheres of interaction, from business to people-to-
people contacts. At the same time, the two countries’ cooperation improved 
also in select multilateral formats, as their most important joint projects are 
trans-regional in nature.24 Curiously, Afghanistan also remains at the center 
of all major international initiatives set forth by Turkmenistan, for 
ideological reasons, through the United Nations. Berdimuhamedow’s calls at 
                                                          
21 Ukaz Prezidenta Turkmenistana Ob otkrytii Posol’stva Turkmenistana v Afganistane (g. 
Kabul), Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, March 12, 2002. 
22 For an account of transport infrastructure projects in Turkmenistan by the end of 
Turkmenbashi’s rule, see Firat Yildiz, “Turkmenistan,” in The New Silk Roads: Transport 
and Trade in Greater Central Asia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Washington: Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2007), 141–66.
23 For the beginnings of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy under Berdimuhamedow, see Slavomír 
Horák and Jan Šír, Dismantling Totalitarianism? Turkmenistan under Berdimuhamedow
(Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2009), 44–67. 
For Turkmenistan’s geopolitics of natural gas, see Slavomír Horák, “Turkmenistan’s 
Shifting Energy Geopolitics in 2009–2011. European Perspective,” Problems of Post-
Communism 59, no. 2 (2012): 18–30; and Martha Brill Olcott, “Turkmenistan: Real Energy 
Giant or Eternal Potential?,” Center for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III Institute for 
Public Policy, Rice University, December 10, 2013,
http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/CES-Pub-GeogasTurkmenistan-121013-1.pdf. 
24 Aigozel’ Aramedova,  “Turkmenistan – Islamskaia Respublika Afganistan: ukrepliaia 
traditsii bratstva i dobrososedstva,” Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, May 27, 2011. 
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the UN General Assembly to host a peace conference in Ashgabat in 2010 on 
confidence-building measures in Afghanistan are an example of this.25
Trade and Economic Affairs
In Turkmenistan it is politics, rather than business, that is the driving force 
for reaching out to foreign partners through external relations. Therefore, 
trade and economic relations after 1991 largely followed the pattern 
indicated above, with its initial upheavals and setbacks. Foreign relations 
have depended primarily on the changing perceptions within the regime of its 
own needs for legitimacy and survival. In mid-1993, Turkmenbashi passed a 
decree that outlined measures for improving economic cooperation with 
Afghanistan and a provision of technical assistance to its northern provinces. 
This act reflected proposals submitted to Ashgabat by two Afghan missions 
earlier in 1992. The measures that were to be adopted ranged from the 
construction of electric power facilities in Afghanistan, over prospecting and 
exploratory drilling for oil and gas, to road reconstruction and upgrading, 
road resurfacing and the reconstruction of a cement production plant; all of 
these activities were supposed to take place in the country’s north and north-
west.26 In 1995 the first direct telephone landline connection was laid 
between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan’s north-west. Furthermore, a new 
border crossing between Ymamnazar and Aqinah was opened in early 1996 
after some delay, thereby complementing the one that already existed 
between Gushgy (Serhetabat) and Towrgondi.27 Aside from a small number 
of local water irrigation projects, however, the presidential directive did not 
                                                          
25 Vystuplenie na 65-i sessii General’noi Assamblei Organizatsii Ob”edinennykh Natsii (N’iu 
Iork, 20.09.2010 g.), in Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, K novym vysotam progressa. 
Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Vol 4 (Ashgabat: Glavnoe arkhivnoe upravlenie pri Kabinete 
Ministrov Turkmenistana, Arkhivnyi fond Prezidenta Turkmenistana, 2011), 396–403; 
Prioritetnye pozitsii Turkmenistana na 65-i sessii General’noi Assamblei OON. 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Secretariat. SEC.DEL/231/10, 
August 30, 2010. For an official account of this initiative, see Mergen Amanov, 
“Turkmenistan – Afganistan: s pozitsii neitraliteta i dobrososedstva,” Neitral’nyi 
Turkmenistan, December 6, 2010.
26 Rasporiazhenie Prezidenta Turkmenistana, Turkmenskaia iskra, August 5, 1993. 
27 Turkmen Press, “Ustanovlena telefonnaia sviaz’ s Afganistanom,” Turkmenskaia iskra,
February 3, 1995; and Turkmen Press weekly digest, no. 6 (102), February 5, 1996. A 
digital file from the authors’ personal collection.
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produce much activity until the end of the decade, not least due to the 
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. 
In late 1994 a first truck convoy from Pakistan reached Turkmenistan by 
way of Taliban-held Kandahar and Herat and returned safely with a shipment 
of Turkmen cotton, thus pointing to the vast opportunities that could be 
realized by building an “economic bridge” between Islamabad and 
Ashgabat.28 In the 1990s, these multilateral projects were elaborated mostly 
according to the framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization, in 
which Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan all have been members. 
However, the time was not yet ripe for this despite the fact that Turkmenistan 
exhibited little unease in maintaining relations with the Taliban until their fall 
in 2001.29 After the end of the Taliban regime, Hamid Karzai, then Chairman 
of the Afghan Transitional Administration, made a rare visit to Ashgabat in 
March 2002 and an important agreement on cooperation in matters of energy 
was signed, thereby paving the way for supplying north and north-west 
Afghanistan with electricity on a large scale.30 Despite this limited progress, 
bilateral trade stagnated and remained low for most of the Turkmenbashi era. 
An intensification in business relations occurred only after 
Berdimuhamedow took office in 2007 and slowly opened Turkmenistan to 
the outside world. During the Ashgabat summit in the summer of 2007, 
Turkmenistan and Afghanistan concluded an agreement on trade and 
economic cooperation, followed by sectoral agreements on, amongst others, 
international transit transport. The countries thereby reciprocally granted 
most-favored-nation status to each other as a first step towards the gradual 
                                                          
28 A. Kurbanova, “Po ‘Doroge mira’ otpravlena pervaia partiia turkmenskogo khlopka,” 
Turkmenskaia iskra, December 10, 1994. 
29    On the Taliban connection, see Murad Esenov, “Vneshniaia politika Turkmenistana i ee 
vliianie na sistemu regional’noi bezopasnosti,” Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz, no. 1 (13) 
(2001): 56–63; Sergei Kamenev, “Vneshniaia politika Turkmenistana,” Tsentral’naia Aziia 
i Kavkaz, no. 4 (22) (2002): 90–103; and Railia Mukimdzhanova, Strany Tsentral’noi Azii. 
Aziatskii vektor vneshnei politiki (Moscow: Nauchnaia kniga, 2005), 125–34. For a good 
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creation of a standard bilateral trading regime.31 At the same time, a bilateral 
commission on trade, economic and technical cooperation was established in 
2007, which held four meetings between 2008 and 2013.32 In the absence of 
almost any meaningful private business initiatives, this inter-governmental 
body turned out to be the key instrument for identifying the main areas of 
future sectoral cooperation in line with the parties’ national plans. 
At present, trade and economic relations revolve around three strategic 
areas. First is cooperation in the electricity sector, which became possible 
due to an apparent stabilization of the security situation in large parts of 
Afghanistan after 2001. Between 2002 and 2004, Turkmenistan provided for 
the construction and further upgrading of two high-voltage power 
transmission lines linking the border settlements of Ymamnazar and 
Serhetabat, respectively, with Sheberghan and Herat. At the same time, 
Turkmenistan’s power engineer specialists and constructors provided for the 
establishment of substations and other electric power infrastructure along 
these lines. This has allowed Turkmenistan to steadily expand supplies of 
electricity to the territories of Afghanistan’s north and north-west, including 
the region’s two most populated cities of Mazar-e Sharif and Herat.33
Furthermore, massive investment projects have been under way in 
Turkmenistan’s domestic power industry since 2011, with the aim of further 
increasing its power generation capacities and producing electricity for 
export to the south.34 Nevertheless, existing plans to expand the two 
transmission lines to Kabul and Kandahar and, in a next phase, to link these 
to Pakistan’s power grid remain on paper only. 
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A second area of cooperation that has potentially far-reaching 
consequences for the geopolitics of Central Asia and beyond lies in joint 
transportation and communications projects. In this respect, Turkmenistan 
can capitalize on its pivotal geopolitical position and a strong 
complementarity of interests with the key international players engaged in 
“reconnecting” Afghanistan through a wide range of transportation and 
communications networks to the wider Central Asian region.35 As of writing, 
the most important infrastructure project in place here is the new joint 
railway line Atamurat-Ymamnazar-Aqinah-Andkhoy, which was launched 
on the occasion of a trilateral Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan summit
in spring 2013.36
Third, cooperation in the oil and gas industry is a matter of utmost 
priority for Ashgabat in the context of its diversification strategy aimed at 
securing multiple export routes to world markets. These efforts are embodied 
primarily in the project of a Trans-Afghanistan gas pipeline. Initiated with 
Pakistan in 1992 and following several unsuccessful attempts at its 
elaboration in the second half of the 1990s, this major capital investment 
project of trans-regional significance gained impetus with the trilateral 
Islamabad summit in May 2002. India eventually joined in 2006.37 In 2010, 
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India signed a framework 
agreement on the gas pipeline, which would carry up to 33 bcm of natural 
gas annually from Turkmenistan’s richest gas fields in the south-east of the 
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country through the territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian 
border town of Fazilka in Punjab.38 Upon completion of all commercial 
contracts between the national oil and gas energy companies in 2013, the 
four parties proceeded to form the TAPI Pipeline Company, Ltd., which was 
designed to own, build and operate the pipeline. The Asian Development 
Bank serves as the transaction adviser in finding a consortium leader.39
Economic relations between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan have seen a 
steady recovery in recent years. According to official Turkmen sources, trade 
between these two countries has grown from some $40 million in 2005 to 
almost $1 billion in 2014.40 Yet, the structure of this exchange is still largely 
underdeveloped. Trade has mostly consisted of Turkmen exports of electrical 
power and LNG, agricultural products, textile production, petrochemicals 
and other primary commodities and goods with low added value, partly as a 
form of humanitarian aid. Given the structural weaknesses of both national 
economies as well as the lack of an investment protection and promotion 
regime, this situation is likely to persist for some time. It must, however, be 
emphasized that, in the context of Turkmenistan’s ambitious development 
and diversification plans, Afghanistan might not necessarily be considered 
solely as an actor on its own but rather as a bridge for extending relations 
with further players in the region, primarily the developing markets of
Pakistan and India. In this respect, Afghanistan’s role is set to grow yet 
further. 
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People-to-People Contacts
Transborder relations between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan rest on close 
historical, cultural and religious ties that traditionally link the peoples of the 
two neighboring nations. As mentioned earlier, the very concept of a border 
in the given context is a relatively modern phenomenon. Moreover, as the 
result of a long common past as well as several migration waves in the early 
years of the Soviet period, a large Turkmen population exists in 
contemporary Afghanistan. Estimated at between half a million and, 
according to Turkmenistan’s authorities, three million people, its exact size 
and composition is impossible to establish. No population census has been 
carried out in Afghanistan since the late 1970s. Regardless of their exact 
number they constitute a significant minority in their areas of compact 
settlement, particularly in the north and north-west of the country, with 
Turkmen villages dispersed throughout the provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, 
Samangan, Balkh, Jowzjan, Faryab, Badghis and Herat; small enclaves of 
Turkmen diaspora, mostly merchants, are also to be found as far as Helmand 
and in the capital city of Kabul.41 This makes the Turkmen diaspora a 
primary target of any transborder policy for Ashgabat in its relations with 
Afghanistan. 
Most of Turkmenistan’s activities in this area are part of broader 
international efforts aimed at Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction and 
have taken shape since Berdimuhamedow came to power in 2007. This 
involves primarily humanitarian aid; already in 2001 Turkmenistan granted 
overflight and transit rights to the international community for these 
purposes. During the harsh winter of 2008, Turkmenistan sent an emergency 
convoy to Afghanistan consisting of over one hundred trucks carrying flour, 
fuel, clothes and oil pumps, worth $2 million in total, alongside the other 
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emergency supplies which have been provided on a regular basis.42 In 
addition, Turkmen specialists have successfully implemented a number of 
small-scale government development projects in north and north-west 
Afghanistan. In particular, a fully refurbished health center in the village of 
Qaramqul, Faryab, and a school facility in Hazara Toghai, Balkh, were 
opened in the summer of 2009 thanks to Turkmenistan’s development 
assistance.43 Recent projects, to be commenced in 2015, include the 
construction and equipping of a maternity home in the border village of 
Towrgondi, Herat, an orphanage in the district center of Sheberghan, 
Jowzjan, and a mosque in the town of Aqinah, Faryab.44
These activities have been accompanied by efforts aimed at human 
capacity-building in Afghanistan. Here, cooperation in education has 
advanced to a certain degree. Since 2002, each year up to thirty Afghan 
youths are offered free education in Turkmenistan’s universities within 
national quotas in line with an inter-governmental agreement. Upon 
completion of their schooling as trained agronomists, power engineers, 
teachers and medical personnel, they will contribute to the painful recovery 
of the still narrow base of Afghanistan’s human resources by providing badly 
needed professional skills.45 Furthermore, some limited contacts have been 
established in health care where every year an additional sixty citizens from 
adjacent areas in north and north-west Afghanistan obtain medical treatment 
at the health facilities of Turkmenistan’s Mary and Lebap regions.46 In 
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theory, framework agreements on bilateral cooperation also exist in the fields 
of science, culture, art, as well as mass media, sports and tourism.47
In regard to the humanitarian sphere, finally, the issue of refugees merits 
attention, although this issue has not necessarily been an example of a model 
development of transborder relations. Turkmenistan has been affected by the 
huge migration flows originating from war-torn Afghanistan, albeit not as 
much as other countries in the region have been. It has served both as a first 
transit stop as well as the final destination for refugees seeking shelter and, 
possibly, a better life. Particularly in the second half of the 1990s, several 
waves occurred of Afghan migrants crossing the Turkmen border illegally in 
their thousands, sometimes with yurts, entire households and livestock, and 
settling, or being interned, in Turkmenistan’s hinterland and causing 
headaches for the oppressive Turkmenbashi regime. As in all previous 
instances, little aggregate data are available concerning this politically 
sensitive topic. Still, there have been credible reports of instances where 
refugees were involuntarily handed back to the ruling Taliban regime from 
which they had previously fled, much to the outrage of international human 
rights organizations.48 In total some 13,000 refugees were officially reported 
to have been granted asylum in Turkmenistan by 2004,49 mostly from 
amongst the ethnic Turkmens of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, whose 
integration into Turkmen society was reasonably expected to be smoother 
than in the case of other ethnic and national groups. 
Whilst definitely no longer negligible, Turkmenistan’s activities in the 
humanitarian domain still lack one important feature that would make 
transborder interaction a true people-to-people policy: the existence of spaces 
in which spontaneous initiatives arise from below. For the moment all 
activities are limited to those authorized by the government and as such 
remain rather narrow in both scope and outreach, targeting almost 
exclusively the Turkmen diaspora in the provinces of Afghanistan’s north 
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and north-west. It is also here that the expected propaganda effect arising 
from these measures is at its greatest. Thus, for instance, since the early 
1990s Afghan Turkmens have regularly been invited to attend the high-
profile conferences of the Humanitarian Association of the World Turkmens, 
a government-affiliated body that strives to cultivate relations with the 
Turkmen diaspora abroad. Aside from this, Turkmenistan’s humanitarian aid 
supplied to Afghanistan often consists of items such as books about the 
President (many of which have supposedly been written by him) that are of 
little practical value to people in need.50 In addition to this, a very restrictive 
visa regime is in place that applies to foreign nationals including citizens of 
Afghanistan and which effectively hampers free transborder contacts. 
Nevertheless, a solid potential exists, largely as a side-effect of the joint 
infrastructure projects, which have been part of broader international efforts 
aimed at Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction that presuppose the 
integration of both Turkmenistan and Afghanistan within a wider regional 
context. However, the implementation of these projects is still pending and 
will depend not only on the political will of all concerned but also on the 
stabilization of the security situation in Afghanistan, the prospects of which 
remain unclear.
Border Security
In the long term perspective, border security is the key security problem 
pertaining to Turkmenistan’s policy towards neighboring Afghanistan. 
Unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the two other post-Soviet states directly 
neighboring Afghanistan, Turkmenistan has afforded comparably little 
attention to the security of the border with Afghanistan after 1991. Doctrinal 
blueprints of Turkmenistan typically define the main threats for national 
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security as stemming from within, rather than from the outside world.51
Nevertheless, in the light of the civil turmoil in Afghanistan and the possible 
spread of religious fundamentalism, terrorism and the illicit trade of drugs, 
border security has always figured high on the Turkmenistan agenda adopted 
by foreign powers and relevant international bodies. In 2005, Turkmenistan 
and Afghanistan finally entered into negotiations over demarcation and 
fortification works on the perimeter of their shared border.52 Despite some 
progress, it is apparent that not every effort has been made to address this 
issue, particularly in the light of the volumes of funds and sectoral 
cooperation programs made available to Turkmenistan for this purpose by 
the international community.53 Since 2013, the situation on the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border has gradually deteriorated, and events 
there have developed into what may turn out to be perhaps the most serious 
challenge for the ruling Ashgabat regime since independence. 
Throughout 2013 militant Afghan groups acting under the umbrella 
Taliban brand, including allegedly hundreds of Turkmen fighters, spread 
their operations farther north and approached to within direct proximity of 
Turkmenistan’s border.54 First violent clashes on the border erupted in 
February 2014, killing three of Turkmenistan’s border guards and several 
militants. Over the second half of 2014, the security situation in north-west 
Afghanistan further deteriorated and clashes broke out between militants and 
newly formed local Turkmen militias. Fighters linking themselves to various 
radical Islamist groups continued to extend their theater of operations into 
adjacent border provinces. There were incidental reports that the militants 
purportedly had some links to the radical Islamists from the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also known as the Islamic State, IS). Nonetheless 
it appears that this movement is still only in the process of taking root in 
Afghanistan. As of early 2015, they were active mostly in the southern parts 
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of the country.55 But with the phased transition of authority and the final 
pullout of the U.S. and NATO forces, this risk may become relevant.
In the case of the Islamic State successfully establishing itself in 
Afghanistan, Ashgabat could be faced with a real threat as it is reasonable to 
assume that these militants would not necessarily respect current 
international borders and would attempt to destabilize Turkmenistan’s 
secular regime from both outside and within.56 Hypothetically, there is a risk 
that the radicals could take over the water management facilities in 
Turkmenistan and thereby shift the water resources away from the Amu 
Darya River and the main Garagum canal. The border area with Afghanistan 
is particularly vulnerable in terms of water security because its waters feed 
into most of the territory of Turkmenistan, which lies farther downstream. 
For the moment, however, it does not seem likely that the insurgents would 
be in a position to accomplish technically complex interventions in the 
existing water flow systems.57 Facing worsening security along its borders, 
Ashgabat seems likewise concerned about the safety of the giant gas fields 
located in the south-east of the country. Unlike in Syria and Iraq, where oil is 
a major source of income for the Islamic State, however, the groups that 
operate near the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border could not reliably count 
on the possibility of similar sales. The transportation of natural gas here 
depends almost entirely on gas pipeline systems. 
Despite the fact that the imminent threat for Turkmenistan is still quite 
low, the incidental raids conducted by militant groups from Afghanistan have 
already forced Turkmenistan’s leadership to engage in intense dialog with its 
southern neighbor, with a view of creating a buffer zone along the joint 
border in order to prevent armed insurgency on the territory of Turkmenistan. 
After some initial communication with the tribal elders and spiritual leaders 
in the north and north-west of Afghanistan, Ashgabat seems to have 
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backtracked from the idea of providing support to the local Turkmen militias. 
Instead, it adopted unprecedented steps to seal the border.58 In 2014, in a rare 
move for unilateral demarcation, Turkmenistan’s border troops captured 
pastures on the Amu Darya islands traditionally used by local Afghan 
Turkmens.59 Further reshuffles are taking place within the military forces. 
Regular border guards are now being complemented and slowly replaced by 
elite army units. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan’s sappers have started digging 
ditches and erecting additional perimeter protection fences. Here, 
Turkmenistan relies on the elements of a relatively well-equipped intrusion 
detection system inherited from the Soviet Union, which has been recently 
improved to some extent.60 However, in the event of a concentrated 
insurgency or raid these border fortifications and barriers will be easy to 
penetrate, as was demonstrated several times already during 2014 and early 
2015. In addition, a complete refurbishment and improvement of the 
fortification facilities along the entire borderline will take time and remains a 
challenge for Ashgabat to resolve before an armed insurgency eventually 
occurs.
Turkmenistan further encounters the problem of lacking well-trained 
border guards and army units that would be able to cover the entire perimeter 
of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border. Poor organization of military 
recruitment as well as corruption and hazing are the main reasons for the 
persistently low combat readiness of Turkmenistan’s border troops.61 In 
order to reverse these trends, Turkmenistan implemented an acceleration of 
recruiting conscripts from among secondary-school graduates, university 
students and those studying abroad during the summer season of 2014.62
Later that year, Turkmenistan’s Defense Ministry began to mobilize reserves 
and launched a campaign designed to attract volunteers to serve in the 
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army.63 All in all, Turkmenistan’s border guards and intelligence services, in 
close interaction with the elite brigades of Turkmenistan’s army, might yet be 
able to prevent or suppress attacks stemming from within. However, it is 
unclear whether they would be able to counter a massive armed insurgency 
staged from beyond its borders. It is in this context that we can read the still-
unconfirmed reports from spring 2015 that state that Russia’s border guard 
officers have returned to Turkmenistan as military instructors so as to train 
Turkmenistan’s forces in guarding Afghanistan’s border.64
Conclusion
The way in which Turkmenistan approached Afghanistan in the context of 
establishing itself on the world scene is illustrative of the evolution of 
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy as a whole after 1991. Conceptually labeled as
neutrality, Ashgabat’s foreign policy following the Soviet collapse 
effectively evolved into an isolationism in internationally affairs. As a 
consequence, relations with its neighbors suffered. Foreign policy was 
largely understood as an extension of domestic policies aimed at the regime’s 
legitimization and survival. This helps to explain the prevalence of 
Turkmenistan’s rather restrained approach in reaching out to Afghanistan. 
Despite the fact that Turkmenistan and Afghanistan are historically close 
neighbors, the level of relations remained generally low for the entire initial 
period following independence, and their intensity and scope, as well as 
prime areas of interaction, were limited. A warming of relations, while still 
taking place rather selectively and targeting a small number of chosen areas, 
became apparent only with the change of power in Turkmenistan following 
Turkmenbashi’s death in late 2006 and is part of Turkmenistan’s gradual 
opening to the outside world. Under Berdimuhamedow, Turkmenistan has 
shifted away from isolation towards a diversification of external relations, 
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including to the states of wider Central Asia. Still, this opening of 
Turkmenistan, just as was the case in its former isolationism, seems to be a 
result of a deliberate decision on the part of its ruling elites rather than a 
possible by-product of a complex interplay in the dynamically changing 
geopolitics of the region. Hence, this may change once again should the 
regime’s perceptions of its need for legitimization and survival further 
evolve. 
While regional affairs have not been the primary focus of this chapter, 
they nonetheless are important for an understanding of Turkmenistan’s select 
priority areas of its engagement. Turkmenistan has been traditionally most 
active in areas of interaction that form the financial backbone of the regime. 
Obviously, this concerns primarily energy and the gas exports that critically 
depend on safe and stable transportation routes to world markets. In this 
context, for Ashgabat Afghanistan is not a matter of interest merely as a 
trading partner per se. Rather, its importance lies in its position as a natural 
and logical transit country for Turkmenistan to reach out to potential 
customers on the Indian subcontinent who, from Ashgabat’s point of view, 
present a welcome alternative in overcoming its inherited dependence on 
Russia. In this respect, the pilot project likely to have the biggest impact on 
Turkmenistan’s international standing to date is the TAPI gas pipeline jointly 
developed by four countries that aims to transport Turkmenistan’s natural gas 
through the territory of Afghanistan to the fast-growing and unsaturated 
energy markets of Pakistan and India. Its importance for the bilateral 
relations of Turkmenistan and Afghanistan is comparatively meager. Yet, a 
stable and viable bilateral link is absolutely vital for the successful 
implementation of this infrastructure project; without this link the project 
will remain only on paper. Framed predominantly in humanitarian terms in 
domestic public discourse, that is, as Turkmenistan’s contribution to 
Afghanistan’s post-conflict reconstruction, this “pipeline of peace” will not 
only give impetus to increased trade but also provide Afghanistan, as the 
transit country, with a source of income, create new jobs and attract 
investments along the planned route and, in this way, prove key to the future 
stability, security and prosperity of the entire region.65 In this sense, 
Afghanistan is an indispensable element in the vast majority of 
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Turkmenistan’s international initiatives which have been raised under the 
aegis of the United Nations. It lends ideological credence to the declared 
peace-loving nature of Turkmenistan’s neutrality. 
Unlike other Central Asian republics, Turkmenistan has until recently
not perceived neighboring Afghanistan primarily through the prism of 
potential security threats arising from within this largely failed state. 
However, the latest Islamist insurgency and recent border clashes appear to 
have changed this perception of Afghanistan and induced the Ashgabat 
regime to take decisive measures in order to counter these threats and 
improve the security of its border. How serious a danger this poses is 
difficult to assess at present. Yet, doubts remain about the ability of 
Turkmenistan to withstand major external shocks such as a large armed 
insurgency, in particular given the bad governance, low institutional 
performance as well as other features of the ruling regime, the legitimization 
and survival of which its foreign policy seeks to achieve. Therefore, much 
still remains to be done in the field of border security so as to make the 
border between Turkmenistan and Afghanistan a true “border of friendship 
and peace,” as most bilateral documents in this area claim in the language of 
institutional foreign policy.
